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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachment to.
Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated
Judgments
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 (FSIA) was
designed to balance the interests of private litigants with commercial or
tortious claims2 against foreign states3 with the interests of the United
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (Supp. I 1976).
2 The FSIA represents a codification of the "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity.
Under this theory, the immunity of a foreign state only extends to suits involving public acts (jure
imperil) of the sovereign and not to suits involving private or commercial acts (jure gestionis) of
the state. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
This principle contrasts with the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, which protects a
foreign state from the jurisdiction of another state regardless of the nature of the activity that gives
rise to the cause of action. Chief Justice Marshall adopted this principle in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), based on the rationale of the "perfect equality and
absolute independence of sovereigns." Id. at 137.
The restrictive theory represents the modem trend in international law. See generally
Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A ProposalforReforms of United States Law, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906-07 (1969). The restrictive theory has been the official policy of the
United States State Department since the issuance of the so-called "Tate Letter." Letter from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Philip Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprintedin 26 Dep'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). The Tate Letter was
influential in judicial decisions, since, prior to the FSIA, courts deferred to the State Department's
individual determinations of sovereign immunity. House REPORT, supra, at 7.
Although the FSIA reaffirms the restrictive theory as embodied in the Tate Letter, the Act
transfers from the State Department to the judiciary the function of deciding sovereign immunity
questions, with the intent of eliminating considerations of political and foreign policy factors. Id.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976)'defines a "foreign state" to include a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, except when used in § 1608 to
describe, the procedures for service of process. Reference to a "foreign state" in the text of this
comment includes all of these enumerated entities. Subsection (b) defines an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," when that term is used in the statute as distinct from the foreign state
itself, as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen or a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c)
and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
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States in minimizing friction with foreign nations.4 The tightrope that
the drafters of the Act' walked is nowhere more apparent than in the
area of attachment of foreign sovereign assets and execution of judgment. Prior to the Act, pre-judgment attachment of assets used for a
commercial activity had served as a means of securing jurisdiction
against a foreign sovereign.' Such attachments had been a major
source of irritation to foreign governments.7 To address this concern,
the FSIA prohibits pre-judgment attachment for jurisdictional purposes.' At the same time, the Act recognizes the plaintiff's interest in
having the capacity to satisfy a judgment once it has been rendered.
Thus, for the first time in United States law, the FSIA provides a remedy to the judgment creditor against a foreign state that seeks to avoid
payment of a final judgment. 9
The abandonment of jurisdictional attachments under the FSIA
has created potential risks for a party that brings an action against a
foreign sovereign. The attachment of assets prior to a judgment may
serve a dual purpose. First, it provides a means of obtaining jurisdiction and second, it provides a means of securing assets upon which a
judgment may be levied.'" The latter is referred to as a "provisional
remedy" or a "protective attachment," since it ensures against the removal of assets during litigation." Under the FSIA, a foreign state's
property is immune from pre-judgment attachment except upon the explicit waiver of that government.' 2 As a result, the foreign sovereign is
free to remove its assets from the jurisdiction of the court in order to
avoid payment of anticipated money damages.
4 According to the testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State,
before the House subcommittee considering the FSIA legislation, the drafters designed the bill "to
facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign
relations arising out of such litigation." Hearingson H
11315 Before the Subcomm. onAdministrativeLaw and GovernmentalRelationsof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
5 The Bill was drafted by the Departments of State and Justice. These departments consulted
with members of the private bar and academic community in preparing the 1976 bill. Certain
segments of the bar had objected to the administration's failure to provide them an opportunity to
have input into the original formulation of the bill, introduced in 1973. The 1973 legislation never
was reported out of committee. 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Monroe Leigh).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

(1965).
7 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
8 See text accompanying notes 17-21 infra.

9
10
11
12

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
Id. at 30.
1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 81 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead).
See text accompanying notes 32-35 infra.
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Two recent federal district court cases' 3 have raised the issue of
whether the Act permits courts to find that a foreign sovereign defendant has impliedly waived its immunity from pre-judgment attachment
by an international agreement entered into prior to the statute. If implied waivers are valid under the Act, courts would have the flexibility
to order pre-judgment attachment without the explicit consent of the
foreign sovereign. The implied waiver theory could enable a plaintiff
to ensure against the possible removal of assets by a sovereign seeking
to frustrate a judgment.
This comment will examine those provisions of the FSIA relating
to attachment and execution, with a focus on pre-judgment attachment
for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment that may ultimately be entered against the foreign state. The benefits and costs of
the Act's restrictions on the use of the provisional remedy will be evaluated upon considerations of foreign policy as well as fairness to private
litigants. Particular attention will be given to the danger faced by litigants that the foreign sovereign will remove its property from the
United States to avoid payment of a judgment. The writer will argue,
however, that an interpretation of the FSIA that would give courts the
power to find an implied waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment is not an appropriate means of resolving this flight-of-assets
problem.
The notion of an implied waiver of pre-judgment attachment immunity conflicts with the language and policy of the FSIA of avoiding
undue harassment of foreign states. Nonetheless, in instances where
there is evidence that removal of assets is imminent, pre-judgment attachment may be the only means of ensuring satisfaction of a judgment. Consequently, the recommended route is to amend the Act so as
to permit courts to use the protective attachment remedy under such
limited circumstances.
ATTACHMENT IMMUNITY AND EXCEPTIONS UNDER

FSIA

Pre-JudgmentAttachment for JurisdictionalPurposes
Prior to passage of the Act, there was no effective means of making
service of process upon a foreign state.'4 Pre-judgment attachment for
the purpose of asserting in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction 15 was the
13 Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979); Reading &
Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
14 Kahae & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward A Uniform Body of Law in Actions
Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 215 (1979).
15 An action in rem is one in which the plaintiff seeks to affect the interests of all persons who
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principal means of providing a foreign sovereign with notice of a pending action against it.1 6 The FSIA, however, prohibits jurisdictional at-

tachments and, in its place, provides a mechanism for service of process
upon a foreign state.' 7
may have claims to a specific piece of property. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDUR7E § 12.7 (1965). There
are two types of quasi in rem proceedings. The first kind concerns claims to particular property of
specifically named persons made parties to the proceeding. The second type is based on a claim
that does not relate to the property. The action is commenced by seizure of the property of the
defendant, and such property is used to satisfy a judgment that may be rendered against the
defendant. Id.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), held
that the mere presence of property unrelated to the cause of action is not sufficient to subject a
defendant to the jurisdiction of the court under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The effect of this decision was to eliminate the use of attachment for the purpose of asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction in the absence of "minimum contacts" among the defendant, the
forum state, and the litigation. Shaffer represents an extension of the doctrine of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), from in personam jurisdiction to in rem jurisdiction.
16 Kahale, supra note 14, at 215; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976) provides for separate service of process procedures for a foreign
state and for an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. The section provides in part:
(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made upon a
foreign tate or political subdivision of a foreign state:
(I) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any
special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial
documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of the
summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the
official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign
affairs of the foreign state concerned; or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3), by sending two
copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each
into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a sined receipt,
to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services-and
the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note
indicating when the papers were transmitted. As used in this subsection, a "notice of suit"
shall mean a notice addressed to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by the Secretary of
State by regulation.
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made upon an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any
special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint either to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process in the United States; or in accordance
with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint, together with
a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political subdivision in
response to a letter rogatory or request, or
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The Act proscribes attachment as a means of commencing a lawsuit by establishing, in section 1609, the general rule that a foreign
state's property located in the United States is immune from attachment arrest and execution, subject to exceptions provided in sections
1610 and 1611.18 Section 1610 permits, under certain conditions, execution of judgment and pre-judgment attachment to secure satisfaction
of judgment that may be entered in the future.' 9 Section 1611 provides

exemptions for certain types of foreign state property from attachment
in sections 1610 or 1611 for
or execution. 20 No exception is provided
2'
purposes.
jurisdictional
for
attachments
The force of the FSIA's policy against jurisdictional atachments is

reflected in a provision governing suits in admiralty, where jurisdictional attachments had been used to bring actions to enforce maritime
liens against vessels owned by foreign states.22 Section 1605(b) requires
in such maritime lien cases that the plaintiff serve notice of the suit to

the person in possession of the foreign-sovereign-owned vessel or his
agent.2 3 Notice to the foreign state is also required in order to establish

an in personam claim against the state.24 If the plaintiff obtains an
arrest of the vessel or cargo pursuant to process, the Act provides as a
sanction that the plaintiff loses the right to obtain thereafter an in personam remedy to enforce the lien. 25 Only when the plaintiff was una(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the agency or instrumentality to be served, or
(C) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place
where service is to be made.
18 Section 1609 reads:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be
immune from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611
of this chapter.
19 See text accompanying notes 38-47 infra.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976) provides for immunity from execution against property of organizations designated by the President as being entitled to privileges under the International Organizations Immunities Act; property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority, unless the bank
or monetary authority has explicitly waived its immunity; and property used for a military activity
that is of a military character or is under the control of a military authority.
21 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610-11 (1976).
22 See 1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at 97 (statement of Michael M. Cohen); see also Carl,
Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The UnitedStates Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L. J. 1009, 1014, 1021-22 (1979).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1) (1976).
24 Id. § 1605(b)(2).
25 Id. § 1605(b)(1); HoUsE REPORT, supra note 2, at 21. The requirement under this subsection that a party that secures a jurisdictional attachment lose its remedy was the subject of some
criticism before the House subcommittee considering the bill. Written testimony submitted by the
Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York argued
that this penalty was "draconian" in relation to the offense. The group stated:
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ware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved is the arrest
a permissible form of notice to the person in possession of the vessel.2 6
Pre-JudgmentAttachmentfor Security Purposes

The pre-FSIA law of sovereign immunity in the United States permitted pre-judgment attachment for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction but not for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment
pending litigation.2 7 Property that was attached to commence a lawsuit

could not be sold in order to collect a judgment, since, prior to the Act,
foreign state assets were immune from execution. Thus, it would have
been fruitless for a court to order protective attachment.2 8

The FSIA nearly reversed the law in this area. Jurisdictional atA provision calling for substantial punitive damages could equally deter without the
arbitrary consequence of putting the plaintiff out of court. Indeed, a viable and perhaps
preferable alternative could be the total elimination of arrest of state-owned vessels in maritime cases.
1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 75 (written testimony from the Committee on International Law of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
26 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1) (1976). Section 1605(b)(2) stipulates that the party who was unaware
of the foreign state involvement must give notice to the foreign state in accordance with the service
of process procedures of § 1608 within ten days of the date on which that party determined the
existence of the foreign state's interest. See also note 17 supra.
A recent judicial opinion suggests that the scope of the exception for the party who was
unaware of foreign states involvement is narrow. On the basis of the legislative history of the Act,
Judge Young in Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165 (D.Md. 1978),
found that the exception is restricted to "rare cases" in which the party attaching the ship couldnot
reasonably have known that the ship's owner was a foreign sovereign. Judge Young rejected the
plaintiff's argument that because it did not in fact know of the foreign state's interest, the attachment was valid. The plaintiff, the court found, could have discovered the foreign state ownership,
since several publications were readily available that would have shown such ownership. The
judge held that the plaintiff had forfeited its in personam remedy for all time, as required under
§ 1605(b)(1). 462 F. Supp. at 1178.
27 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
In Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc.2d. 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct.
1959), the United States Attorney General submitted a letter from the Legal Adviser of the Department of State setting forth the official position as follows:
The Department always recognized the distinction between "immunity from jurisdiction" and "immunity from execution". The Department has maintained the view that under
international law, property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to satisfy even a
judgment obtained in an action against a foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from
suit. ...
The Department is of the further view that even when the attachment of the property of
a foreign sovereign is not prohibited for the purpose of jurisdiction, nevertheless the property
so attached and levied upon cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit
because, in the Department's view, under international law the property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution even in a case where the foreign soveign is not immune from
suit.
Myers, Contemporary Practiceof the UnitedStates Relating to InternationalLaw, 54 AM. J. INT'L
L. 632, 643 (1960).
28 See 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 31 (statement of Bruno A. Ristau).
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tachments are no longer permitted, but a successful litigant under certain circumstances may execute against foreign state property.2 9 The
Act, however, does not substantially alter the rule of immunity with
respect to pre-judgment attachments for security purposes.3 °
The general principle of immunity from attachment, as provided
in section 1609, has been interpreted to apply to pre-judgment attachment for purposes of securing payment of a judgment that may later be
entered against a foreign sovereign. 3 t The only exception to this rule of

immunity from protective attachments is embodied in section 1610(d),
which provides that property of a foreign state used for a commercial
activity 32 in the United States shall not be immune from attachment
prior to entry of judgment under two conditions. 33 First, the foreign

state must have explicitly waived its immunity from pre-judgment attachment, notwithstanding any purported withdrawal of the waiver, except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.34 Second, the purpose
of the attachment must be to secure satisfaction of a judgment that may
ultimately be entered against the foreign state, rather than to obtain

jurisidiction. 35 The legislative history of the Act suggests that a waiver
may be accomplished by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, or an
official statement.3 6
Post-JudgmentAttachmentfor Purposes of Execution

In place of the former rule of absolute immunity from execution,
29 See text accompanying notes 38-50 infra.
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (Supp. 1 1976).
31 Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 391 (D.N.J. 1979); Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) provides the definition of "commercial activity":
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose.
33 Id. § 1610(d).
34 Id. § 1610(d)(l).
3:5Id. § 1610(d)(2).
36 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 28. The report's analysis of § 1610(a)(l), which permits
execution against property of a foreign state upon explicit or implied waiver of immunity, states:
"A foreign state may have waived its immunity from execution, interalia, by the provisions of a
treaty, a contract, an official statement, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings leading to judgment or to execution."
Although the Committee's discussion of the various means of providing waiver apply to postjudgment attachment, immunity from pre-judgment attachment presumably could be waived by
these methods as well, so long as the waiver is explicit, as required under § 1610(d). A treaty,
contract or official statement might provide the basis for an explicit waiver. The fourth means of
creating a waiver---"steps taken by the foreign state in the proceeding"-appears, however, more
likely to be a source of implied waiver than of explicit waiver.
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the Act restricts executional immunity by providing exceptions to immunity in section 1610.37 Section 1610(a) enumerates the conditions
under which property in the United States of a foreign state may be
subject to attachment in aid of execution or to execution once a judgment has been entered. 38 Execution is permitted only if the property of
the foreign state is used for a commercial activity in the United
States. 39 Such property is subject to execution if either: (1) the foreign
state has waived its immunity from execution either explicitly or implicitly;4" (2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based;4 (3) the execution relates to a judgment
establishing rights in property which has been taken in violation of international law;4 2 (4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing
rights in property which is acquired by succession or gift, or which is
immovable and situated in the United States, provided that the prop37 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).,The trend in international law is toward applying the restrictive
theory of immunity to execution as well as jurisdiction. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. One
commentator stated before the FSIA's enactment:
Recent research in the field shows only the United States and the United Kingdom as
actively supporting the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity from execution, whereas
Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Egypt, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Switzerland, and the
U.S.S.R. seem to support the amenability of government property to attachment in aid of a
judgment.
Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading,Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 109,
120 (1961).
Another study, however, found that some nations that give their courts authority to execute
place various restrictions on this power, such as requiring authorization by another branch of
government. Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 241-42 (1951).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976). The FSIA itself does not specify procedures for execution of a
judgment. The House Report analyzing the bill cites Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the controlling authority. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
Rule 69 provides in part:
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution,
unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in
accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United States governs
to the extent that it is applicable.
FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
Rule 69 brings about the application of state execution laws. The applicability of varying
state procedures for judgment enforcement arguably conflicts with the general goal of the Actuniform treatment of foreign sovereigns. See Note, The Problem of Execution Uniformity Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 andFederalRule of Civil Procedure69, 12 VAL. U.L.
REV. 569, 598-99 (1978).
39 For the definition of "commercial activity", see note 32 supra.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (1976).
41 Id. § 1610(a)(2).
42 Id. § 1610(a)(3).
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erty is not used for diplomatic purposes;4 3 or (5) the property consists of
any contractual obligation or proceeds from such contractual obligation to indemnify the foreign state under a policy of automobile or
other liability or casualty insurance covering the claim which merged
into the judgment."
For purposes of the exceptions to immunity from execution, the
Act differentiates between property of a foreign state and property of
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.45 Section 1610(b) provides for a lower barrier of immunity in the case of an agency or instrumentality engaged in a commerical activity in the United States than in
the case of a foreign state. 46 The major difference in the treatment of
these two classes is that execution against foreign state assets is valid
only if the property is used for a commercial activity, whereas a levy
upon property of an agency or instrumentality is allowed regardless of
whether the property is commercial in nature.4 7 The section 1610(a)
exceptions to executional immunity listed above apply to agencies or
instrumentalities of a foreign state as well as to the foreign state itself.4 8
In addition, execution is permitted if the agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity or if
the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality
is not immune under the Act.49 The property is subject to execution
regardless of whether the property was used for the activity upon which
50
the claim giving rise to the judgment was based.
Before ordering execution, a court 5' is required under section
1610(c) to determine that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment, or in cases of a default judgment, follow§ 1610(a)(4).
44 Id. § 1610(a)(5).
45 For definitions of "foreign state" and of "agency or instrumentality of foreign state," see
note 3 supra.
46 The FSIA's establishment of different standards for purposes of execution as between foreign states on the one hand and their agencies or instrumentalities on the other hand is artificial.
One commentator pointed out that the state inself determines whether a task is to be performed by
an "independent" agency or by a department of the government. See Note, Immunity of Foreign
Sovereigns, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 493 (1973).
47 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
48 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976).
49 Id. § 1610(b).
50 Id. § 1610(b)(2).
51 The HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 30, states that the statute allows only a court to issue
an order for attachment of foreign sovereign property. The report notes that some jurisdictions
permit attachment to be accomplished simply by applying to a clerk or sheriff. Such a procedure
would not afford sufficient protection to a foreign state, the report states.
43 Id.
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ing notice of the judgment to the foreign state.5 2 The House Report
notes that this subsection contemplates that the courts will exercise discretion in permitting execution. The report states:
In determining whether the period has been reasonable, the courts should
take into account procedures, including legislation, that may benecessary
for payment of a judgment by a foreign state, which may take several
months; representation by the foreign state of steps being taken to satisfy
the judgment; or any steps being taken to satisfy the judgment; or evidence that the foreign state is about to remove
assets from the jurisdiction
53
to frustrate satisfaction of the judgment.
Under section 1610(d), a court may order attachment of foreign
state assets prior to the lapse of the "reasonable period of time," required under section 1610(c), only upon the explicit waiver of immunity on the part of the foreign state.54
EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT PROVISIONS

Foreign Relations
One of the major policies underlying the FSIA is that of deference
to foreign states. This policy is based on a desire to prevent, as a side
effect of bringing the foreign sovereign under the personal jurisdiction
of a United States court, strained relations between the United States
and the defendant foreign state." The policy of deference is also based
on an expectation that a foreign state will reciprocate if the United
States is brought within its jurisdiction. 6 These foreign policy goals
are reflected in the prohibition of pre-judgment attachment for purposes of jurisdiction and security, except, in the latter case, upon the
explicit waiver of the foreign state. 7
There are a number of reasons for the Act's strict limitations on
the use of pre-judgment attachment. The House Committee Report
52 Section 1610(c) reads:
No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be
permitted until the court has ordered such attachment and execution after having determined
that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry ofjudgment and the giving of
any notice required under section 1608(e) of the chapter.
53 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.

54 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
55 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. The potential for strained relations was particularly acute in cases of attachment. In addition to the irritation created, jurisdictional attachments
were a source of embarassment to the State Department. The department was placed in the sensitive position of considering requests for immunity on the part of foreign states protesting the
attachment. Kahale, supra note 14, at 215.
56 See 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 62 (statement of Michael H. Cardozo), 97 (statement of
Michael M. Cohen).
57 See text accompanying notes 17-36 supra.

Pre-JudgmentAttachment under the Immunities Act

2:517(1980)
characterized attachment for jurisdictional purposes as a "shotgun approach" that irritated many foreign governments.58 Jurisdictional attachment may immobilize foreign sovereign assets located in the
United States from the time at which the suit is initiated until the time
any judgment the court renders is satisfied.5 9 In some cases, foreign
governments have been faced with attachments of a number of different assets in various parts of the United States.6" Having property tied
up for an indefinite period of time may interfere with the orderly functioning of foreign offices of the government and with the payment of
debts.6 These potential hardships may provide the foreign state with
an incentive to place its monetary reserves in a country that does not
permit attachment, a move that would hinder United States domestic
business as well as international trade.62
Judgment Satisfaction
The extent to which the Act protects sensitive international relationships is limited by the competing statutory objective of ensuring
satisfaction of judgments obtained by private litigants. The FSIA's
grant of power to the judiciary to enforce execution represents a major
benefit to parties who have successfully litigated the merits of a claim
against a foreign state. The private sector lobbied strongly in favor of
the section 1610 provisions restricting immunity from execution.63
American business interests were concerned about hardships potentially facing private litigants seeking to collect judgments from recalcitrant foreign states. 64 Under pre-FSIA law, a private party could
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state and overcome a defense of sovereign immunity in a commercial action and yet have no means to sat58 House REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
59 Note, Sovereign Immuniy-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 443 (1977).
60 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
61 Note, Immuni y ofForeign Sovereigns, 6 N.Y.U.L INTr'L L. & POL. 473, 496 (1973).
62 Id.

63 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 58-59 (statement of Peter M. Trooboff), 68 (statement of
International Law and Transactions Division of the District of Columbia Bar), 73 (written testimony of Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York),
.85 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead). The House subcommittee heard favorable testimony concerning the provisions for enforceable execution from representatives of such groups as the American Bar Association, the District of Columbia Bar, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, and the Rule of Law Committee. The latter is an organization comprised of attorneys and
other representatives of American companies engaged in foreign commerce and investment. Id.
at 79 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead).
64 Id. at 81 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead).
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isfy its judgment, unless the foreign state voluntarily paid.6 5
Some commentators have suggested that the value of the provision
permitting compulsory executions is diminished in light of the absence
of any mechanism for protective attachment of assets without the explicit waiver of the foreign state.66 Despite the congressional goal of
judgment satisfaction, as represented by section 1610, the Act allows
the foreign sovereign to dissipate or to remove its property from the

jurisdiction of the court in order to avoid payment of a judgment that
may later be entered.6 7
The flight of foreign state assets during litigation was not a risk
prior to the enactment of the FSIA for two reasons. 68 First, since property of the state was generally attached in order to obtain jurisdiction,
such property could not be removed pending litigation.6 9 Second, even
if property was not attached for jurisdictional purposes, a foreign state
would have no reason to remove its assets, since the principle of executional immunity allowed a foreign government to avoid a judgment
simply by refusing to pay.7 0
The FSIA's barriers to attachment for jurisdictional and security
purposes were criticized by several private bar groups at the time the
legislation was under consideration in Congress. 7 One group testifying before the House subcommittee considering the bill noted that a
foreign state as a plaintiff could, under general procedural rules, secure
pre-judgment attachment for security purposes against a private de65 See note 27 supra.
66 Atkeson, Perkins, & Wyath, HR 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill of Sovereign Immunity Timefor.4ction, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 298, 308 (1976).
67 Id.
68 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 84 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead).
69 Id.
70 See note 27 supra.
71 The Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
stated in written testimony to the House subcommittee that it was "uncomfortable" with the elimination of provisional remedies, even though it supported the bill as a whole. The Committee
suggested that the statute be amended if experience indicates that removal of assets to frustrate
judgments is a problem. 1976 Hearings,supra note 4, at 76 (written testimony of Committee on
International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). The Rule of Law
Committee also expressed the opinion that a future amendment may be necessary. Id.
A representative of the Maritime Law Association, an organization of admiralty lawyers, told
the House subcommittee that the elimination of pre-judgment attachment and arrest remedies was
the only material disadvantage of the bill. Id. at 97 (statement of Michael M. Cohen). In part, the
Association's objections were based on a perception that there were no effective means for making
service of process upon a foreign state. Id. at 96. A minority of the maritime bar group also
criticized the bill on the ground that pre-judgment attachment is sometimes necessary as a method
of assuring satisfaction of a judgment. Id. at 98. Although the group as a whole endorsed the
legislation, the minority of members who favored protective attachments withheld their support of
the bill, since they wanted further time to study it. Id.
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fendant, even though a private plaintiff could not obtain this remedy
against a foreign state.7 2 A spokesman for the Maritime Law Association testified that a minority of its members felt that the risk of flight of
assets would be particularly serious in cases where a foreign state has
property in the United States only infrequently." This minority contended that by defaulting in litigation and leaving no property against
which a judgment could be executed, such countries could conduct
business in the United States without the fear of having their property
immobilized.7 4

Although the elimination of pre-judgment attachment has been
criticized, cases involving intentional removal of assets prior to a judgment ordinarily do not arise because of several pragmatic factors. The
state may have a variety of assets located in the United States, some of
them difficult to liquidate or remove.7 5 Because the United States is an
international commercial center, instances in which a foreign state has
no property in the United States would be rare.7 6 Moreover, states
often find that the benefits of good commerical and diplomatic relations with the United States provide a sufficient incentive to satisfy a

valid judgment, so long as the state has had a fair opportunity to litigate the merits.77
72 Id. at 81 (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead).
73 Id. at 98 (statement of Michael M. Cohen).
74 Id.
75 For the comments of Judge Duffy in Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,
478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), about the risk of flight of Iranian assets from the United States,
see text accompanying notes 114-16 infra. It should be noted that Judge Duffy's opinion was
handed down September 27, 1979, prior to the seizure of American hostages in Iran and President
Carter's Executive Order 12170, freezing Iranian assets in the United States. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
76 Michael Cohen, chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation of the Maritime Law
Association, said in House testimony that cases in which a foreign state has no property in the
United States are probably rare. He also noted that even though foreign states in some cases have
defaulted, Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1967), or
have run away from judgments, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d. 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1961),
such instances are also rare. 1976 Hearings supra note 4, at 99 (statement of Michael M. Cohen).
In Kane, the Soviet Union and a Soviet shipping company defaulted in a personal injury case
and resisted efforts by the plaintiff to collect the judgment. 267 F. Supp. at 712. The defendants
failed to respond to requests for payment on the part of the State Department as well. Id. In
Rich, the Republic of Cuba revoked its previous waiver of immunity and refused to pay a consent
judgment recovered by two longshoremen. 295 F.2d. at 25. The State Department accepted
Cuba's assertion of sovereign immunity, and the court held that it was bound to defer to the State
Department's determination. Id.
77 With respect to the problem of failure to pay judgments against a foreign state, one commentator notes:
Foreign governments engaged in borrowing, purchasing, chartering ships and trading can
and often do resist litigation arising out of these activities. But once a judgment is obtained. . .it seems likely that the governments will pay, rather than default on a final judg-

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

2:517(1980)

Although these factors may deter most foreign governments from
avoiding judgments through the removal of assets, such actions may

occur in exceptional circumstances, particularly where political tensions exist between the United States and a foreign nation. In the midst
of the 1979 hostage crisis at the United States Embassy in Iran, Iran
reportedly planned to transfer its funds that were deposited in American banks to other countries. 78 In response, President Carter ordered a
freeze on official Iranian assets located in the United States 79 to ensure
that financial claims against Iran could be satisfied.8°
As the Iranian matter illustrates, the disruption of sensitive political relations may precipitate a large-scale withdrawal of assets with the
intent, or at least the effect, of frustrating claims against the foreign
nation. Even though such cases are rare, the potential harm to private
claimants is substantial.8 ' By failing to provide for pre-judgment attachment, except in cases of explicit waiver, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act inadequately protects against the flight of assets in such
circumstances.
One commentator has suggested that courts may have discretion
under the FSIA to determine whether a sovereign has waived its immument. A combination of commercial and diplomatic pressure would probably induce
governments that have an interest in maintaining good commercial reputations in the United
States and good diplomatic relations with this country to pay judgments that have become
final after due notice and full opportunity to contest on the merits. Those countries that do
not care about their commercial reputation in the United States and have no diplomatic
goodwill to protect--e.g. the Castro government in Cuba-are not likely to be caught by an
attachment of property either, except on a highly sporadic basis.
Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reforms of United States Law, 44
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 901, 928-29 (1969).
78 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
79 Id. The freeze order, Executive Order 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979), and the Iranian
Assets Control Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 65956, 65988, 66832, 67617 (1979) (amending 31 C.F.R.
§ 5 (1978)), block assets of entities owned or controlled by the government of Iran, such as nationalized businesses, as well as purely governmental assets.
80 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979 § 1, at 1, col. 3.
81 Despite the existence of the freeze order, the concern among private claimants that Iran
may remove its assets from the United States in the future remains. An estimated 200 claims
against Iran are currently pending in the United States district courts. 305 U.S. EXPORTS WEEKLY
(BNA), at C-I (April 29, 1980). The types of cases include bank loan defaults, trade creditor
matters, and expropriation of property. 302 U.S. EXPORTS WEEKLY (BNA), at C-I (April 8, 1980).
The claimants fear that the United States government may rescind the freeze order as part of an
agreement to secure the release of the American hostages or to improve relations with Iran. Legal
Times of Washington, Feb. 25, 1980, at 10. Because Iran would be free to remove its funds if the
freeze order is lifted, the need for pre-judgment attachment for security purposes might arise.
Consequently, a central issue in the pending cases against Iran is expected to be the validity of
pre-judgment attachment under the Immunities Act. 302 U. S. EXPORTS WEEKLY (BNA), at C-1
(April 8, 1980).
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nity from pre-judgment attachment.8 2 He predicted that where the risk
of frustration of judgment appeared particularly great, a court may be
more willing to find a waiver of immunity in order to prevent the removal of property which would otherwise be subject to execution. 83 As
will be subsequently demonstrated, however, the suggestion that courts
may have the authority to use an implied waiver of immunity from
protective attachment as a vehicle for reducing the risk of the flight of
assets is of dubious validity under the letter as well as the policy of the
Act.
IMPLIED WAIVER OF PRE-JUDGMENT ATTACHMENT IMMUNITY BY

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
The FSIA provides different standards for determining the validity
of waivers for pre-judgment attachment and for post-judgment attachment in aid of execution. While a waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment must be explicit under section 1610(d),8 4 a waiver of
immunity from execution may be either explicit or implicit under section 1610(a)." This difference in the waiver standard suggests that
to foreign
Congress viewed pre-judgment levies as unduly burdensome
86
attachments.
post-judgment
with
compared
when
states
The statute provides two routes through which a foreign state may
waive its immunity from pre-judgment attachment. First, the state may
explicitly waive immunity under section 1610(d). Second, section 1609
specifies that the provisions of the Act relating to attachment and execution are subject to modification by international agreements entered
into prior to the passage of the Act.87 Many treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation to which the United States is a party provide for
waiver of immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of party states
and from execution of judgment.8 8 Thus, a waiver of immunity from
pre-judgment attachment provided by a treaty would constitute an in82 Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 450-51 (1977).
83 Id.
84 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(1) (1976).
85 Id. § 1610(a)(1).
86 Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
87 28 U.S.C. § 1609,(1976) states that the general principle of immunity from attachment of
the property of foreign states and the exceptions provided in §§ 1610 and 1611 are subject to
existing international agreements to which the United States is a party.
88. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United StatesIsrael, art. XVIII, para. 3, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan art. XVIII, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No.
2863.
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dependent basis upon which a court could order attachment of foreign
sovereign assets prior to entry of judgment.89
The savings clause in section 1609 and the explicit waiver provision of 1610(d), when taken together, however, create a serious ambiguity within the statute. The Act is silent as to whether an implied
waiver contained in a treaty would be sufficient under section 1609 to
subject the foreign state's property to pre-judgment attachment, even
though an implied waiver is not sufficient under section 1610(d).
Two recent federal district court decisions illustrate the tension resulting from the statute's silence on the issue of implied waiver created
by treaty. In BehringInternational,Inc. v. ImperialIranianAir Force,9"
Federal District Court Judge Fisher interpreted section 1609 as permitting pre-judgment attachment on the basis of an implied waiver contained in an international agreement notwithstanding the requirement

of section 1610(d) that a waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment be explicit.

In Behring, the plaintiff petitioned the district court for a writ of
attachment of property of the Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force
(IRIAF) to secure the plaintiff's claim.9 1 IRIAF, an agency of the Iranian government within the meaning of the Act,9 2 argued that its prop-

erty was immune from attachment prior to judgment under section
1610(d).9 3 The Behring case was complicated by the existence of the

Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between
the United States of America and Iran (Treaty of Amity), an agreement
entered into in 1955. 94 The treaty provides:
89 Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 394 (D.N.J. 1979); Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The importance of the questions of treaty and statutory construction raised in these decisions was pointed
out by Georges R. Delaume in United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Prejudgment
Attachment, 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1369 (1979), in which both the Behring and Reading opinions were reprinted.
90 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
In Behring, the plaintiff, Behring International Inc., had entered into a contract with the
Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) in 1975 under which Behring agreed to perform freight forwarding services in regard to IIAF goods being shipped to Iran. In January 1979, at the height of
the political turmoil leading to the revolution in Iran, business between the two parties was terminated. Behring sought payment for freight services rendered under the contract amounting to
$390,494 but the IIAF, and later its successor, the Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, refused to
comply.
91 Id. at 387.
92 For the statutory definition of "agency", see note 3 supra.
93 475 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.N.J. 1979).
94 Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty of Amity]. The court assumed that the Treaty remained valid despite the Iranian revolution. 475 F. Supp. at 390 n.19.
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govNo enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including.
shall, if it engages in comernment agencies and instrumentalities.
mercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the
territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for

itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution
of judgment, or other liability to which privately owned and controlled
enterprises are subject therein. 95

While this treaty provides a waiver of immunity from suit and
from execution of judgment, it does not by its terms deal with immunity from pre-judgment attachment. Consequently, Judge Fisher ruled
that this provision of the Treaty of Amity did not constitute an explicit
waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment, as required by section 1610(d).96 Judge Fisher concluded, however, that this treaty clause
97
constitutes an implied waiver of pre-judgment attachment immunity.
Applying "ordinary principles of construction," he found that the language "other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein" indicates that the preceding language, citing
specific forms of liability, was used for the purpose of illustration rather
than limitation. 98 Moreover, he noted that the treaty shows an intent to
place the sovereign parties on the same footing as private parties in the
other country's courts. 99 As the court pointed out, pre-judgment at-

tachment may be used as a remedy in cases involving private parties." °°
In light of this construction of the Treaty of Amity, Judge Fisher
found it necessary to examine the effect of the FSIA on the terms of the
treaty. He rejected the Iranian Air Force's argument that the FSIA's
prohibition of protective attachment absent explicit waiver precluded
judicial recognition of any implied waiver contained in a treaty prior to
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'' Judge Fisher determined that the section 1610(d) requirement of an explicit waiver
95 Treaty of Amity, supra note 94, art. XI, para. 4 (emphasis added).
96 475 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D.N.J. 1979). In a subsequent case also involving the Treaty of
Amity, a court found that the treaty provides an explicit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction of
United States courts within the meaning of § 1605(a)(1). Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Social
Security Organization of Iran, No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opin-

ion granting preliminary injunction). This opinion is not inconsistent with Behring's interpretation of the treaty. The issue in Electronic Data was waiver of immunity from suit, which is
specifically provided in the treaty as a form of immunity that is waived. The treaty does not,
however, specifically state that pre-judgment attachment immunity is waived. For this reason,
Judge Fisher in Behring found no explicit waiver of pre-judgment attachment immunity within

the meaning of § 1610(d). 475 F. Supp. at 393.
97 475 F. Supp. at 393.

98 Id. at 395.
99 Id.

100 Id.
101 Id.
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does not in any way limit the savings clause in section 1609, which
preserves the terms of the Treaty of Amity. 10 2 Moreover, he found that
03
the Act should not control the construction of prior treaties. 1
The FSIA, he reasoned, represents a source of substantive law and
not of treaty construction principles.' °0 He stated that the Act does not
"require the drafter of a 1955 treaty to anticipate the requirements of a
law that will be passed twenty-one years later."' 0 5 Because the court
found the Treaty of Amity to be in full force and effect and because it
discovered an implied waiver of immunity therein, the property of0the
6
Iranian Air Force was subjected to attachment prior to judgment.1
In Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co. ,"7 Judge
Duffy took issue with Judge Fisher's view of the relationship between
the Treaty of Amity and the FSIA. °8 In Reading, the court had
granted an ex parte order of attachment, and the plaintiffs made a motion to confirm the attachment, as required under New York law. 10 9
The purpose of the attachment was to secure any judgment that might
be rendered after consideration on the merits." 0
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under
a state statute of establishing the grounds for attachment, the need for a
continuing levy, and the probability of success on the merits.I1 ' The
plaintiffs contended that attachment was necessary to insure against the
risk that Iran may cut off oil sales to the United States or require that
its customers' payments be made outside the United States." 2 Such
102 Id. at 394.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.

106 Id. Judge Fisher noted that his decision would be different if the waiver were contained in
an ordinary commercial agreement, in which case the saving clause would not apply. Congress,
he noted, chose to treat international agreements differently from commercial agreements. Id.
107 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
108 In Reading, plaintiffs Reading & Bates Corp. and Reading and Bates Exploration Co.
brought a motion to confirm the court's order of attachment of approximately $26 million which
the defendant, National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), had deposited in New York banks.
The plaintiffs had entered into a three-year charter agreement with the Oil Services Company
of Iran (OSCO) for use and operation of the plaintiff corporations' oil drilling rig in Iranian
territorial waters. OSCO was concurrently under a service contract with NIOC. Pursuant to this
agreement, OSCO was to conduct oil and gas exploration and drilling for NIOC,which was to
provide funding for the performance of the service contract. The plaintiffs claimed that payments
to it pursuant to the charter were stopped and the NIOC,as the "alter ego" of OSCO, refused to
return the rig. The cause of action was based on unlawful taking and conversion. 478 F. Supp. at
725.
109 N.Y. Civ. PpAc. LAW § 6223(b) (McKinney 1980).
110 478 F. Supp. at 726.
III Id.
1t2 Id. at 727.
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events would reduce National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) assets in New
York, they argued. 13 Judge Duffy, however, discounted the possibility
of removal of assets in this case.' 14 He noted that NIOC had some
$700 million on deposit with New York banking institutions and that
the possibility of withdrawal of all these funds was too remote to justify
continuing the pre-judgment attachment.115 Judge Duffy found that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish sufficient insecurity of enforcement
of a potential judgment to justify the harsh remedy of attachment."I6
Even though Judge Duffy vacated the levy on grounds of state law,
he proceeded to address the issue under the FSIA of the validity of the
defendant's claim that it was immune from pre-judgment attachment." 7 NIOC was found to be an agency of a foreign state covered
under the FSIA.118 As in Behring, the plaintiffs' sole basis for claiming
that the defendant waived its immunity from pre-judgment attachment
was the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran.' 19 Judge
Duffy rejected, however, the plaintiffs' contention that an implied
waiver by treaty supersedes the section 1610(d) requirement that a
waiver be explicit.' 2 He gave weight to the different waiver standards
that the Act establishes for pre-judgment attachment and for post-judgment attachment.121 Judge Duffy inferred that Congress intended that
waiver of pre-judgment attachment immunity should not be lightly imas potentially more harplied because it considered such attachments
22
rassing than post-judgment attachments.1
Judge Duffy acknowledged that the strict rules of construction do
not require that the FSIA be binding on the interpretation of the Treaty
of Amity. 23 Nonetheless, he stated that, in the interest of consistent
policy, a waiver of pre-judgment attachment immunity should be explicit, even if it is accomplished by treaty.' 24
Although both the Behring and Reading courts raise valid arguments in their respective attempts to resolve the ambiguity underlying
the statute, the result in Behring appears to be inconsistent with con113 Id.

114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 728.
118 See note 3

supra.

119 478 F. Supp. at 728.
120 Id.
121 See text

accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
122 478 F. Supp. at 728.
123 Id.at 729.
124 Id.
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gressional intent. While there is little legislative history interpreting the
international agreement savings clause of section 1609, the House Report's analysis of a parallel clause in section 1604 relating to jurisdictional immunity offers some guidance.12 5 The House Report addresses
the general question of conflict between treaties and the statute:
In the event an international agreement expressly conflicts with this
bill, the international agreement would control. .

.

. Treaties of friend-

ship, commerce and navigation and bilateral air transport agreements
often contain provisions relating to the immunity of foreign states. Many

provisions in such agreements are consistent with, but do not go as far as,
the current bill. To the extent such international agreements are silent on

agreea question of immunity, the bill would control; the international
126
ment would control only where a conflict was manifest.
This statement seems to indicate an intent on the part of the House
committee to avoid conflicts between a treaty and the statute so long as
the treaty can reasonably be interpreted consistently with the Act. Although Congress intended to preserve existing international agreements, it apparently sought to prevent courts from using treaties as a
means of overriding the objectives of the statute absent a clear conflict
27
between the two.1
As Judge Fisher conceded in Behring, the Treaty of Amity does
125 The wording of the savings clause of section 1604, which provides for immunity from jurisdiction subject to existing international agreements, is identical to the corresponding clause of
section 1609.
126 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.

One commentary has raised the question of whether the FSIA was intended to be interpretive
of existing treaty provisions in cases where the treaty arguably is less restrictive of immunity than
the Act but where the treaty is subject to differing interpretations. As an example, the writers cite
provisions contained in United States treaties with both Japan and Germany stating that the
restrictive principle of immunity applies to "corporations, associations, and government agencies
and instrumentalities" engaged in commercial activities. The commentators noted that since the
clause lacks any reference to governments or political subdivisions engaged in commercial activities, the treaty is subject to the interpretation that such entities are granted immunity, under the
principle of inclusio unius, exclusio alterum (the expression of one thing excludes another). The
commentators found that the statute is unclear as to whether the savings clause of section 1604
would permit this treaty to control over the provision of the Act that denies immunity to a foreign
state, or its political subdivision, engaged in a commercial activity-§ 1605(a)(2). Atkeson, supra
note 66, at 309.
The legislative history cited in the text appears to provide an answer to these commentators'
specific illustration. Since that treaty fails to state whether or not the immunity of governments
and political subdivisions is restricted, the treaty is silent on this particular question of immunity.
The House Report states the Act would control in such cases where there is no manifest conflict
between the treaty and the Act. If, however, the treaty expressly provided that the states and their
political subdivisions would be granted immunity, the legislative history suggests that the international agreement would control.
127 Even though Congress did not intend that the FSIA abrogate existing treaties, Congress has
the power to repeal or amend a treaty by statute if it chooses. The Supreme Court in Chae Chan
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not provide an explicit waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment. While Judge Fisher's construction of the treaty is a reasonable
one, the words "or other liability" at least leave room for doubt as to
their meaning.'2 8 Thus, the conffict between the Treaty and the Act is
hardly manifest. Even aside from the legislative history, it seems appropriate to construe vague words of a treaty in a way that avoids undermining the congressional policy, based on foreign relations

concerns, of limiting resort to use of pre-judgment attachments.
RECOMMENDATION

As the preceding discussion suggests, the notion that waiver of im-

munity from pre-judgment attachment may be implied by treaty is subject to criticism both on policy and on statutory grounds. The
suggestion here is not to ignore the statute's failure to provide protection against the risk that a foreign state will remove its assets from the

United States in order to frustrate satisfaction of a judgment. The remedy to this problem, however, should be narrowly drawn so as not to

undermine the foreign relations objectives of the Act.
The legislative history of the Act recognizes the risk of the flight of
assets. The analysis of section 1610(c), which requires courts to order

execution only after a reasonable period of time has elapsed after entry
of judgment, 29 states that courts can exercise their discretion to order
post-judgment attachment without delay where there is evidence that
the state is about to remove its assets. 130 Courts, thus, should be able to

order pre-judgment attachment, as well as post-judgment attachment,
when it is necessary to ensure satisfaction of a judgment that may be
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), ruled that where there is a conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the last expression of the sovereign controls.
The House Report's suggestion that courts construe treaties in a way that avoids conflicts with
the statute is consistent with the policy of the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190 (1888). Since treaties and legislative acts are equal under the Supremacy Clause, the opinion
states that: "[T]he courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that
can be done without violating the language of either...." Id. at 194.
128 In addition to his dispute with Judge Fisher concerning the relationship between the treaty
and the statute, Judge Duffy in Reading also reached a contrary finding as to the meaning of the
Treaty of Amity. Judge Duffy noted that the primary factor governing the construction of a treaty
is the intent of the parties. He reasoned that if the parties had intended to create a waiver of
immunity from pre-judgment attachment for security purposes, they would have been suggesting,
in effect, that provisional remedies would be necessary in the future to ensure judgment satisfaction. Judge Duffy found it "hard to imagine" that a sovereign nation entering into a treaty to
promote commerce would contemplate that it might evade a lawful judgment relating to its commercial activities. 478 F. Supp. at 729.
129 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (Supp. 1 1979).
130 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
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entered. Such a remedy would not constitute a return to the "shotgun
approach" represented by jurisdictional attachments. 3 ' Congress apparently intended to eliminate indiscriminate use-of attachments that
unnecessarily offend and inconvenience foreign states. 132 The provisional remedy proposed here would be permitted only where evidence
indicates an actual risk of flight of assets. In such cases, the interest of
the plaintiff in judgment satisfaction would outweigh the interest of the
foreign state.
The terms of the Act, however, simply do not provide courts with
the power to order pre-judgment attachment, except upon explicit
waiver. Given the limitations of the Act, the appropriate solution lies
in legislative process. An amendment to the Act could provide the
courts with explicit guidelines for determining whether there is sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances justifying pre-judgment attachment for security purposes. Such criteria would limit the discretion of
courts in determining whether to order an attachment.
CONCLUSION

Suits against a foreign sovereign engaging in commercial activities
generally are not likely to involve a serious risk of flight of assets prior
to entry of judgment, since foreign states and their agencies have an
incentive to maintain good commercial and diplomatic ties to the
United States. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act lacks, however,
a preventive mechanism to deal with those cases in which a foreign
state entity that is less concerned with maintaining friendly relations
seeks to evade an anticipated judgment. The FSIA has attempted to
balance the somewhat conflicting goals of securing satisfaction of judgments against foreign states and of protecting sovereigns from undue
compulsion and harassment. The Act has struck the balance by restricting immunity from post-judgment attachment but by preserving
immunity from attachment prior to entry of judgment absent an explicit waiver. A construction of the statute that would allow courts to
find an implied waiver contained in a treaty is an inappropriate remedy
for the flight of assets problem, since such an interpretation is inconsistent with the policy of the Act. The risk of removal of foreign state
assets should be addressed instead by amending the Act to allow courts
to order pre-judgment attachment whenever the hazards are sufficiently
great. It is unlikely, however, that courts would have to resort to the
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device frequently. The existence of the power to use such 'a measure
may in itself deter the flight of a foreign sovereign's assets.
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